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ABSTRACT 
 
 
MILITARY REGIME TRANSITION TO CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY IN  
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: 
LEARNING FROM THE EXAMPLE OF GOOD PRACTICE IN GHANA 
 
By 
 
Indre Bimbiryte 
 
 
During the last year the “Arab Spring” is capturing the world’s attention as a positive, albeit 
violent, fight against autocracy and dictatorships. However, a lack of democracy on the African 
continent remains high. Ghana is like an island of hope for the neighboring countries which are 
still ruled by the “iron fists” of their leaders, most of whom cover under the veil of feigned 
democracy. Having emerged from the military dictatorship, Ghana is an excellent example of a 
consolidated democracy for other Sub-Saharan nations. Starting as a fake democracy under the 
rule of Rawlings in the 1990s, Ghana eventually reached gradual democratization. The 
government has shifted powers already several times through free elections as the Ghanaian 
population actively took part in its country‘s rule. Free media and civil society continue to ensure 
the stability of democracy, as well as independent institutions that create steadiness in the 
process of consolidation. Ethnicity which most of the time creates tensions and remains one of 
the main issues on the African continent, in Ghana’s case can be seen as a factor that has a 
potential to further support the overall democratization.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Africa is the second largest continent covering about 22% of Earth‟s surface and 
second in population in the world (The Africa Guide n.d.). At the same time, it is extremely 
poor and faces most difficulties. According to the Freedom House data, most African 
countries (also see: Annex I and II) still cannot be called free as they lack basic political 
rights and civil liberties
1
. The continent is continuously ravaged by inner wars and ethnic 
conflicts. Out of 54 sovereign states only a small fraction can be called democracies (i.e. 
Benin, Ghana, and South Africa). Taking into consideration the enormous amount of aid that 
has been given to this continent for more than half a century in form of official development 
assistance (ODA), NGO support and peace keeping operations, one cannot help but wonder 
why Africa‟s human rights and standard of living are still at the bottom level and how it is 
possible to democratize Africa. 
Since the 1990s, Africa has experienced a new push for democratization
2
 which 
turned out to be not very successful. According to Larry Diamond (1996), at the end of the 
20
th
 century the “wave of democratization” ended. The situation today remains uncontrollable 
and unpredictable. During the last 20 years there can be listed numerous cases of 
governments‟ change in sub-Saharan Africa, coup d‟état and other political as well as 
economic instabilities. Therefore, this paper will concentrate on the enabling/limiting factors 
for military regimes in Africa to be transformed into democracy and for their democracy to 
be consolidated.   
In the first part of the work the historical background of the continent will provide 
basic background information about the overall military regimes transitions in the region. 
                                                          
1
 The political rights issues are grouped into three subcategories: Electoral Process, Political Pluralism and 
Participation, and Functioning of Government. The civil liberties questions are grouped into four subcategories: 
Freedom of Expression and Belief, Associational and Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal 
Autonomy and Individual Rights (Freedom In the World 2010). 
2
 De-colonization period was the time of liberation from foreign rule; while starting from the 1990s – breaking 
away from internal dictatorships.  
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Certain trends will be observed from the 1990s to date. This will help to further distinguish 
internal/external factors that create the impetus for transition. To add more, such a historical 
analysis will provide an insight to the general understanding of democratization in Africa and 
where lies its “Achilles‟ heel.” Afterwards, the hypothesis will be presented as well as a short 
review of the used methodology. In the mentioned chapter the concept of consolidated 
democratization will be analysed determining the most influential factors, such as free 
elections, functioning institutions, viable civil society, and freedom of expression. According 
to these, as well as using the research methods, a selected case of successful transition in 
Ghana will be more thoroughly presented. Through the case study method and comparative 
inquiry, country‟s experience will enable to look more deeply into the hypothetical triggers of 
the country‟s transition to the long term democracy. Having identified them, the following 
step will be to distinguish if one country‟s successful experience can be applied to other Sub-
Saharan countries in transition.   
Limitations are unavoidable as it is impossible to create a panacea for the faults of 
transitions towards democracy. The main goal of this paper is to establish a pattern which can 
be witnessed and applied in real life situations in other Sub-Saharan countries facing a 
military regime change. This paper does not examine how to establish an incentive for the 
emergence of civil society or environment, suitable for the rule of law. Moreover, it is 
understandable, that the reasons behind each military regime and its‟ transition differ 
depending on the historical, cultural, economic, and political backgrounds. It is hard to create 
a single rule which would work in all cases. On the other hand, I believe (although I do not 
want to make any generalizations) that Africa within itself has strong connections and faces 
the common future, thus certain level of common analysis and assumptions can be applied to 
it as a single unit.  
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2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 PERIOD OF DE-COLONIZATION 
In the middle of the 20th century Africa was de-colonized. Continent, which was 
almost entirely
3
 ruled by colonizers since 1900, received freedom, which also brought 
hardship and eventually destabilized the region. During the colonial rule, colonizers lavishly 
used natural resources (such as gold, copper) unlimited. They did not take into consideration 
cultural differences, geopolitical confusion while making the continent more “civilized” – 
that was presumed to be “the White man‟s burden” (Decolonization of Africa n.d.). Looking 
at the political map of Africa, it is visible that country borderlines were drawn by the 
colonisers without regard to the already established small kingdoms. Due to that, people who 
belonged to the same tribe, with the same language, heritage and traditions suddenly 
belonged to three different countries that most often fought in between (today it still is the 
case for some Congolese tribes as well as many others). Thus, the overall experience of 
Africa “has been one of colonial brutalization, exploitation and underdevelopment” 
(Ihonvbere 1997, 289), and this left long term after-effects on countries which were facing 
newly gained independence after de-colonisation.  
Even though the borders as they were set during the colonial rule were more or less 
accepted, the new states lacked the “indigenous cultural roots for internal legitimacy” (Deng 
1998, 139). African states that emerged after colonial oppression were missing a very 
important ingredient that would further empower their emancipation and self-governance: 
people did not see themselves as a unity, as a nation. For example, during the British rule in 
Rwanda, Tutsi ethnic group was promoted to be superior over Hutu and they were given all 
better governmental positions. It was believed that Tutsi were better “equipped” to rule over 
                                                          
3
 „By 1905, African soil was almost completely controlled by European governments, with the only exceptions 
being Liberia (which had been settled by African-American former slaves) and Ethiopia (which had successfully 
resisted colonization by Italy). Britain and France had the largest holdings, but Germany, Spain, Italy, Belgium, 
and Portugal also had colonies” (Decolonization of Africa n.d.). 
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Hutu (this idea was a false creation of the colonizers). In the end this led to the tragic 1994 
Rwanda genocide. Even today the ethnic tensions between the two groups remain high.  
At that time anything reminding of colonizers was perceived as evil and undesirable. 
Democracy, as a creation of Western societies, was one of the “evils.” According to Deng 
and Lyons (1998), any kind of international interference or offered help was seen as a threat.  
Eventually, as long as the government, formed in a country, was local, it was accepted by the 
Organization of African Unity
4. Instead of promoting “good governance to those regimes that 
effectively or responsibly administered given territory” they would let anybody who was in 
the presidential palace to rule the country “regardless of how (or even whether) the regime 
governed” (Deng and Lyons 1998, 1). Such a principle created perfect conditions for the 
military dictators, who ruled uninterrupted by for decades, i.e. Mobutu Sese Seko ruled 
Congo for 32 years, and Jean-Bédel Bokassa ruled Central African Republic for 19 years
5
. 
Military dictators ruled ruthlessly, not taking into consideration local people. As Deng (1998, 
137) points out in his article: “African leaders saw human rights and democracy as luxuries to 
be sacrificed or postponed until their people were sufficiently advanced.” Which in the end 
happened to be the least important issue to pursue – all interest was concentrated in keeping 
the power and sharing the recourses with loyal followers.  
                                                          
4
 Established in 1963, today it is known as the African Union. South Africa became a 53rd member in 1994. 
„The OAU aims to promote the unity and solidarity of African States; co-ordinate and intensify their co-
operation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; defend their sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and independence; eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; promote international co-operation, 
giving due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and co-
ordinate and harmonize members‟ political, diplomatic, economic, educational, cultural, health, welfare, 
scientific, technical and defense policies“ (International Relations and Cooperation n.d.). 
5
 Today there still is a number of such long term military dictators: Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, 
President of Equatorial Guinea since 1979; Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso (1987-present), Omar 
Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir, leader of Sudan (since 1989) and many others (Change.org 2010).  
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2.2 “THIRD WAVE” OF DEMOCRATIZATION 
De-colonization was a failed attempt for democracy in most of African countries. 
As mentioned earlier, it resulted in the emergence of military autocracies. Yet in the 1990s 
another opportunity originated fuelled by a number of external and internal factors (see the 
Table No. 1 below). These determinants initiated the transition in the region. Moreover, they 
influenced the form of the transition itself as well as its success or failure. The following 
section analyses the triggers of democratization in more detail. 
Table No. 1 
External and Internal Factors of Democratization in Africa 
External conditions  Internal conditions 
 End of Cold War; 
 International (Western democracies) 
pressure; 
 Cuts in aid and monetary pressure; 
 Financial and economic crisis in 
international level; 
 Emergence of new markets in post-
Soviet states.   
 Financial and economic downfall in 
national level; 
 Lack of stability within the military 
regime; 
 The change in the leadership of the 
regime: more moderate/liberal 
successor; 
 Emerging civil society. 
 
2.2.1. External factors 
In the literature there are many different opinions as to what brought down the 
“open”6 dictatorships in Africa, yet everybody agrees on one common factor – end of the 
Cold War. If before “Africa had been an object of ideological rivalry between the Soviet 
Union and the United States“ (Deng and Zartman 2002, 107), now new expectations for a 
whole continent emerged. After the Soviet Union crumbled, communism could no longer be 
used by African rulers as a pretext
7
 to oppose the western way of governance. At the same 
                                                          
6
 Term „open dictatorship” should be understood as an opposite to military rule under a civilian cover: after the 
1990s wave of democratization most military regimes only changed their appearance into civil, yet people 
behind the „wheel” remained the same. Moreover, most countries which were democratized in the 1990s after 
some time failed to keep democracy and went back to being authoritarian.    
7
 As already mentioned before, democracy was seen as an invention of former colonizers, thus military dictators 
easily explained their strict governing policy as a tool for building communism. 
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time the influence of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund was also growing. It 
became clear that capitalism (so much despised till then) was going to dominate the markets 
of the world. Therefore, in order to get their share the developing countries had to “play” 
according to the rules of the Unites States which emerged as a Cold War winner.  
During the Cold War period the West was not interested in what was happening in 
Africa. With a growing threat from the East and a possibility of a Third World War, 
developed countries deliberately let slip the brutality of some regimes under their eyes, which 
at that time were terrorizing their own countries (for example, the ethnic cleansing policy by 
Idi Amin in Uganda and many others). Once the Soviet Union ceased to be a threat, the West 
turned back to the Africa. Military dictatorship could no longer be tolerated in the world 
where democracy was seen as the only possible way of governance of modern society.  
Due to international pressure, big cuts in aid, the change was unavoidable. During 
the decades of their rule dictators managed to extract the last bits of resources of already 
poverty stricken countries, and were facing huge debts. Money was one more trigger that 
pushed for a change. As Ihonbvere (1997, 90-91) observed, “Kamuzu Banda (Malawi„s 
former President-for-life) who had previously declared his country out of the range of the 
democracy drive was equally compelled by a drastic cut in British aid from 10 million 
pounds (sterling) to 5 million pounds (sterling) in 1992 to make concessions to prodemocracy 
agitators,” as well as “Nigeria‟s former strongman politics could ensure continuing Western 
and donor support for the country‟s industrialization programs.” Yet simply withholding aid 
does not give the results which are expected by the donors. Eventually it “simply compels the 
incumbent government to introduce political change on its own term” (Ihonvbere 1997, 309). 
The regimes were willing to satisfy the party which promised money, while making sure that 
the power would remain on their side no matter how it would be called: parliamentary 
democracy, presidential democracy or any other name.  
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Overall, western world focused on pressuring the African governments through 
monetary actions. It was expected that change to democratic rule and a combination of 
special programs of recovery, created and supervised by the International Monetary Fund or 
World Bank specialists, would be the answer to all problems (Ihonvbere 1997). This plan was 
flawed from the very beginning. First of all, seeing that change is unavoidable, the “typical 
response of African authoritarian regimes” would be to try to create a custom made 
“democracy” which would legitimize military rule in the eyes of an outside society and 
guarantee the flow of aid and grants. In such cases authoritarian regimes would create 
structures which are similar to democratic yet the posts would be given to former supporters. 
Such act was simply an “attempt to legitimize the potently illegitimate” (Saaka 1997, 147). 
Secondly, imposing plans from the top (outside country), which were supposed to help 
countries to recover, was a pure waste of money and time. It is impossible to make efficient 
and implementable suggestions without profound understanding of the contemporary 
situation and the conditions of the countries. In the end, all resources accumulated in puppet 
ministries and in foreign bank accounts of top leaders and their followers.  
Another weak point of such a transition to democracy in Africa was that everything 
was done for wrong reasons: “in order to satisfy the new political conditionalities of Western 
governments, bankers, donors and nongovernmental organizations” (Ihonvbere 1997, 290), 
which suddenly were very much interested in Sub-Saharan continent. Such reasons behind 
transition were superficial and did not have a long term perspective. This is why eventually 
most of the 1990s democratization wave countries soon gave up democracy. Democracy per 
se has to come from the people and should have people‟s support. Democracy of the 1990s in 
Africa, looking from a wide perspective, was most likely imposed by the international 
community governments, while regular people remained under the same oppressed 
conditions not participating in their country‟s life.  
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Overall, the end of the Cold War had two main effects on Africa: first, it created a 
possibility for the region to recover on its own; secondly (and paradoxically), abandonment 
by superpowers raised doubts about Africa„s future, economic role, and a possible increase in 
marginalization (Deng and Zartman 2002). Eastern Europe became the most attractive part of 
the world for all investments, with comparatively cheap, but well educated labour force. 
Africa continued receiving a lot of international attention and pressure to democratize, yet not 
enough of what could be called “moral support” which was needed to make a successful 
transformation to consolidated democracies.   
2.2.2. Internal factors 
Parallel to external factors there are several important internal pressures that highly 
accelerated the transition to democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Saaka (1997, 146) claims 
military regimes faced “sheer weight of time.” As the author notices, regimes had a tendency 
to ignore the reality or suppress it with further aggressive approach hoping that fear will keep 
the system stable. Yet the bottom up pressure did not let the regimes to relax: people grew 
restless of decades of suffering which sometimes under local dictators were far worse than 
under colonial rule. Ihonvbere (1997, 293) mentions many internal triggers, such as 
“unemployment, ethnic and religious upheavals, increasing bankruptcies, rising militancy 
among non-bourgeois constituencies, and restlessness within military and security networks.” 
The regime was facing dissatisfaction stemming both from inside and outside. The situation 
was so bad that sometimes the dictator was not able to trust even his main force– military8 – 
anymore. Moreover, rising number of guerrilla movements also threatened internal stability 
of dictatorship; therefore “surrendering to democracy” seemed to be the only solution.  
Due to the mentioned reasons elections took place almost all around the African 
continent at one point or the other. Ibonvbere (1997) notices, that in this case it is important 
                                                          
8 It is important to stress that the military was the key actor which brought the dictator to power in the very 
beginning. 
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to distinguish between what we call democratization and a real democracy. According to him, 
the military regime easily enacted the transition, but that did not establish full grown 
democracy. Moreover, he stresses that as democracy was pushed mostly by former colonizers, 
African countries accepted any agenda (not necessarily these were relevant to the countries‟ 
conditions and needs, and implementable) of the transition which ensured the constant flow 
of money. Meanwhile, Western countries concentrated not on enabling the societies, but on 
pure numbers and market shares, praising the overall economic development of the countries. 
Civil society, basic human rights were left on the side. “The democratization of national 
politics in Africa, not the transformation of government as such, was the primary and 
immediate object” (Prempeh 2008, 111) upon which all efforts were concentrated. Prempeh 
(2008) further says that even the opposition within countries was motivated not by the reform 
as such, but more by the idea of the possibility to create their own government. It was like a 
battle for power shares within the country. People did not seek to establish a democratic 
country for everybody; democracy was seen simply as a mean to create the government for 
themselves with the most egoistic goals of profiting.  
Joseph (1998) in his article for the Journal of Democracy described an example of 
Zambia when in 1991 President Kaunda (ruler for 27 years) was forced to give way to 
democratic polls due to the pressure both from international community and the opposition. 
The new government was formed by the Movement for Multiparty Democracy, led by 
Frederick Chiluba. The author observes that although there was a possibility to start a real 
democracy, “elected government arrested outspoken journalists and civil society activists; 
detained political opponents; used mysterious bombings as a pretext for imposing states of 
emergency; and amended the Constitution to ban Kaunda from competing in 1996 elections. 
In six years Chiluba has taken Zambia back to the worst period of what had been” (Joseph 
1998, 6). In Zambian case, the democratic transition means were used to change one 
10 
 
authoritarian regime into another. To sum up, for the most of African countries, the 1990s 
were more like experimenting with democracy, than a real transition to democratic rule.  
As there are many unsuccessful examples of transition, at the same time one cannot 
ignore that there exists a positive trend as well.  Benin
9
 was the first African country which 
completed a successful governmental change peacefully at the will of its people in March 
1991 (Bratton and Van De Walle 1997). Afterwards, there was a sudden upsurge of 
Sovereign National Conferences in 12 countries (mostly French-speaking). Their civil society 
members took over the power, organized elections, and created new, more open political 
systems with newly written and more democratic constitutions (Deng and Zartman 2002).  
Other important steps were taken to stabilize the transition of the continent. In 1991 
spring various civil groups together with government representatives met in Kampala, 
Uganda “to discuss security and stability in Africa” (Deng and Zartman 2002, 104). Outcome 
of this conference was the proposal to create the Conference on Security, Stability, 
Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA). During the meetings, which were held 
not only in Africa, but also in Europe, participants were encouraged to learn from other 
experiences, especially the Helsinki process
10
. Yet at the same time it was acknowledged that 
the African procedure has to be unique and tailored to its special situation. Deng and Zartman 
(2002) also emphasize the debates held with African NGOs in order to hear their opinion. 
Most important outcome of CSSDCA was the Kampala Document, which raised quite a few 
issues, such as sovereignty, security, stability development and cooperation. For example, it 
expanded the traditional understanding of security by including individual security: “security 
of one African country‟s individuals is also relevant for other African countries” (Deng and 
Zartman 2002, 120). Moreover, Kampala document is based on a belief that only through 
democracy it is possible to reach economic development. Lastly, “the most revolutionary 
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 Even today Benin remains one of the most stable democracies in Africa according to Freedom House 2010 
data (scoring 2 points (1 point being the highest) both in political rights and civil liberties. 
10
 1975 Helsinki Accords were extremely important for countries oppressed by the Soviet Union.  
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aspect of the Kampala principles … is their penetration into internal affairs of the state” 
(Deng and Zartman 2002, 139) – it broke the shield of sovereignty, used by many military 
dictators, as well as imposed responsibility for other countries to be active when there are 
troubling signs from neighbouring states. 
Agreeing on principles was not as difficult as implementing them. The Organization 
of African Union did not adopt the CSSDCA proposal. As Deng and Zartman suggest (2002), 
the reasons behind could be a lack of political will; a sceptical approach to something, which 
was considered to have Western initiative; pressure of time and other.  Yet the Kampala 
Document remains an important creation of African nations outlining the basic principles, 
rights and obligations, which were drawn out from the regions own experience and 
understanding. Creation of these principles shows the common understanding of how the 
transition should be pursued within the region. Most importantly, Kampala document is an 
African “offspring”, just slightly influenced by outside actors. That gives a certain weight on 
its provisions/common decisions.  
Countries, which emerged as not perfect democracy examples, have a possibility to 
strengthen their status and improve overall performance, although it might take some time. 
According to Prempeh (2008, 110), one recent trend showing a certain positive development 
is limitations on presidential terms: “By the end of 2005, thirty-three African constitutions 
contained presidential term-limit provisions. Term limits have ended the tenure of fourteen 
presidents in Africa since 1990.” This shows that it becomes less and less possible for one 
man to have all power in his/her hands. Pluralism (in whichever form it may be) is becoming 
a norm in Africa.  
 
12 
 
3. HYPOTHESIS AND RESEARCH METHODS 
As it has been discussed in the previous chapter, the overall democratisation of the 
military regimes in Africa has been a challenging issue. The goal of this paper is to analyse 
the successful democratization of Ghana and identify the important factors and steps in the 
transition. Furthermore, I claim that Ghana is an exemplary approach of achieving 
consolidated democracy, therefore, can be used as a model and be replicated by other Sub-
Saharan countries which are still struggling to fully democratize. Ghana through an electoral 
process had chosen a new democratic government which was encouraged and approved by a 
public consensus, reached by educated and politically conscious citizens, who, despite being 
ethnically diverse, unified for a common goal. This hypothetical claim will be addressed 
through several qualitative
11
 research methods, chosen as the most suitable for this case.  
Firstly, it is important to clarify the understanding of the transition from the military 
regime to democracy. From several well-known definitions one will be distinguished that will 
be applied in the paper. This has to be done in the very beginning as it is an important part of 
the analysis that leads to the testing of the hypothesis. Without understanding this question – 
what is transition leading to a consolidated democracy – as a starting point, it would be 
difficult to continue with the rest of the analysis.  
A regime transition per se is a change of one set of rules to the other. The transition 
can be instant and sharp, “when a coercive autocracy collapses and gives way to an elected 
democracy” (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 10). Or it can develop gradually, step by step 
relaxing the “firm fist” and offering a “softer” version of authoritarian rule (Bratton and van 
de Walle 1997). Transition, which is discussed in this paper, is from military regime to 
democracy. Such an autocratic rule can be defined as a type of government when the power is 
                                                          
11
 Qualitative research is chosen over a quantitative research as the author believes that deeper analysis of other 
factors than numbers and statistics is more useful in this case. Although figures also play an important role in 
the paper, the overall descriptive approach is more revealing; it helps to find the reasons behind the certain 
actions of politicians and general masses that sometimes cannot be explained by a quantitative approach. 
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in the hands of military. Military based regime is not a new phenomenon. Actually, for the 
most part of the existence of a “civilized human being” the power was concentrated in the 
hands of a person who had certain organized forces on his side. Thus democracy as we 
understand today and which comes from the United States constitution, parliamentarian 
democracy, born in England, and with the French revolution movement, is extremely young. 
The 20th century can be considered as a new era for it (especially after the de-colonization 
and the fall of the Soviet Union, when many countries gained independence or restored it 
back). 
Defining democracy is a widely debated issue without a clear answer as to what are 
the most important components. According to Schumpeterian theory, elections are the most 
important factor (Huntington 1991). They undeniably take a major role in contemporary 
democracy, but they also have to fulfil certain criteria: they have to be competitive, open, and 
be held periodically with a possibility for all adult population to vote without race or gender 
discrimination. Such elections are common in developed Western countries, which have a 
long history of competitive democratic change of government. Yet in the African context 
elections cannot be the only factor leading towards democratization of the country.  
In countries that are in transition elections are often used as a tool for fraud. Usually 
donor countries “tie” certain democracy conditions to aid. Most of the time the main 
condition is to establish the government, elected by popular vote. Such a condition can be 
ineffective. Firstly, the military can fabricate elections and legitimize their power as a civil 
government. This creates an even bigger problem: for the outside world it becomes harder to 
criticize and question the regime and its actions, which before were visibly autocratic, yet 
after elections it can play the “legitimacy” card.  Secondly, even if military rulers give in and 
let elections to take place, once it is obvious that the results are not satisfying, they will 
14 
 
simply annul them as, for example, this was the case in Nigeria and Algeria (Gyimah-Boadi 
1991).   
Elections should be analysed taking into consideration the African context which is 
very unique and different. Deng (1998, 140) observes:  “Because democracy has become 
closely associated with elections in which Africans tend to vote on the basis of ethnic or 
religious identity, democracy risks becoming a dictatorship of numbers, with the majority 
imposing its will on the minority.” Thus even if there are free and honest elections, it may 
still be not enough to reach the consolidated democracy in Africa. Although for the Western 
society majority rule is considered to be a norm, it is because Western countries are more 
homogenous and Western society is more united. In the African case, ethnicity itself is not a 
limiting factor, but the already existing tensions between the different groups within the 
country have to be resolved in advance. 
Abedeji (1994, 128) claims, that “the kind of democratization that Africa needs 
goes well beyond the ballot box and tries to avoid some of the limitations of the Northern 
model of democracy.” According to him, the West does not believe in the democracy which 
they promote: too much bickering between parties and struggles for power. What Africa 
needs, according to him, is a democracy, based on mutual understanding and consensus, not 
the majority rule.  Therefore, what is needed in Africa is not only an electoral process, which 
is prone to fall to the “electorialist fallacy12,” but also an establishment of civil liberties, 
which would generate the creation of social capital and raise a conscious civil society, able to 
be an active and efficient participant in elections.  
How can one define the successful consolidation of democracy in Africa? What 
would be the indicators of completed transition? For further analysis, the understanding of 
consolidated democracy will be borrowed from Linz and Stepan (1996), who propose that 
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 When free elections are considered to be a sufficient condition for democracy. 
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consolidated democracy is one that can be perceived by society as the best option and there is 
no significant struggle to overthrow a democratically elected government, as the needed 
changes and reforms can be reached through democratic means, as well as conflict resolution 
through established democratic institutions
13
. Authors also introduce five factors, which 
according to them are needed for the consolidation to take place: free and lively civil society, 
autonomous political society, rule of law, independent state institutions and economic society.  
The proposed understanding of consolidated democracy has to be tailored to the 
African perspective. For example, as it was mentioned, civil society plays one of the main 
roles in the transition, because precisely on the free and viable civil society democracy is 
built. Even after the transition, civil society continues to “act as watchdogs for citizens‟ rights” 
(Gyimah-Boadi 1998, 23). The difficulty in Africa is that the civil society movement is not as 
developed as in the rest of the world. This is mostly because of the already mentioned 
ethnical division (as well as other reasons). Moreover, there is a trend for civil society groups 
to become politicized, especially when the leaders of NGOs are elected into new democratic 
government and as Gyimah-Boadi (1998, 23) puts it, they dive “into partisan politics.” 
 As for the creation of the bureaucratic machine, it is important to remember that 
most of the institutions upon which the new democratic transition is built, were introduced by 
colonizers. Accordingly, depending who were imperial powers, the system in Africa was 
either based on a British, or French origin. When the colonizers came, they did not take over 
lands with an indigenous people living in the huts. They overpowered the already established 
system which was perfectly functional during the pre-colonization period: 
“African political systems, whether empires, kingdoms, centralized states, or 
stateless societies, were structured in a hierarchy in which the basic unit was the 
family, extended to the lineage and the clan, with the cluster of lineages and clans 
constituting territorial entities and ultimately nations. Despite the hierarchical 
nature of the system, these entities were generally governed by consensus and broad 
                                                          
13
 Diamond (1994, 15) also defines consolidated democracy as one where it “becomes so broadly and 
profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break down.” 
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participation through group representation at the central level and village councils 
at the local level” (Deng 1998, 143).  
Ethnic identities and strong tribal connections will not disappear anytime soon; 
moreover, assimilation between Africans will not happen within next century (if ever). Ethnic 
diversity per se is not an obstacle, yet it can be easily manipulated, if it is not properly 
managed, and create tensions between people. In order to create a working consolidated 
democracy in Africa, it requires taking into consideration the good practise of pre-
colonization society structure: looking into the overall decision making process, examining 
“indigenous African institutions and value systems and the way they have been used or 
undermined in order to determine whether they retain elements that could be integrated into 
the reform process” (Deng 1998, 142). Although it is understandable, that the system, which 
remains from the colonial period and now is the basis of institutions in emerging democracies, 
cannot be fully replaced, yet it is possible to transform (upgrade) them so they relate more to 
the country‟s original political history and traditions.  
To sum up, the regime‟s transition to a consolidated democracy is a long and 
complex process, let alone in the region such as Sub-Saharan Africa. One cannot forget the 
specific context of the region and has to apply additional conditions to the basic definition of 
the democratic consolidation, as the general definition is not enough. Therefore, socio-
cultural observations, that are unique for Africa, will play an important role in the paper 
while analysing the topic. 
Hypothesis in itself carries a case study implication as it is based on Ghana‟s success 
model. In order to prove it, one has to carefully study Ghana‟s background, analyse historical 
information and all other relevant elements. To make this analysis, the descriptive method 
will be used. This method allows looking at the issues at hand with a more flexible view. 
Moreover, it allows gathering useful and actual information about the situation that is now in 
Ghana, as well as how it has changed during the years. Descriptive method allows a wider 
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choice of recourses that can be used while analysing the case – scientific publications, 
newspapers, various newsletters printed by international or local organizations, and other 
announcements. The author will concentrate mostly on African sources in order to present the 
actual situation observed by the locals, as well as official worldwide recognised sources to 
ensure objectivity of the case. With the help of the already mentioned research methods, the 
case study of Ghana will be carefully analysed in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. CASE OF GHANA 
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Ghana regained independence from 
the British Government in 1957 and today 
is seen as one of the democracy models in 
Africa. Freedom House in 2010 World 
Freedom country report on Ghana 
evaluated political rights with the highest 
score – 1, while civil liberties with 2. Last 
Presidential elections in 2008 and 
Parliament elections in 2009 were 
announced to be fair and competitive. Today the 
government faces similar problems as any other democracy does: fight with corruption, 
solving the problems left after the global financial crisis, development issues, as Ghana is still 
dependant on foreign aid. Despite that, Ghana can be seen as an example of a consolidated 
democracy. One could be sceptical as it has been less than 20 years since the Constitution of 
Ghana entered into force
14
. Overall, this transition by many scholars
15
 in early days was 
deemed to be “pseudo-democratization” (Ihonvbere 1997, 95) rather than the real and fruitful 
change. Yet it is undeniable that for African region, where regimes change every one or two 
years, such stability as Ghana enjoys today can be seen as a long term achievement (also see: 
Annex III).  
Further analysis of the case will concentrate on the historical and current events 
evaluation in the light of Ghana‟s way towards democratic consolidation. Looking through 
the historical overview gives a perspective of main obstacles that were hindering 
democratisation in Ghana, as well as how they were undergone, and an opportunity for the 
real democratisation was created. Based on such research, the key to the question if other 
                                                          
14
 March 6, 1993. 
15
 Ihonvbere (1997), Saaka (1997) and others. 
Map from World Regional Geography 
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African countries could embrace Ghana‟s experience as an example of a transformation from 
military regime to a stable and established democracy from an African perspective can be 
found. Therefore, the hypothetical claim that should surface from this case could be that 
under similar trends of certain political change and loosening of previously restricted rights, 
together with continuously growing possibilities for freedom of expression (i.e. unrestricted 
freedom of press, internet access and other), active civil society, and ascending trust in the 
newly elected government (during free and competitive elections), other Sub-Saharan 
countries could become consolidated democracies from still existing autocratic military 
regimes.  
 
4.1 GHANA UNDER MILITARY REGIME OF RAWLINGS 
After gaining independence
16
 Ghana was established as a democratic country led by 
Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah who was overthrown in 1966 by coup d‟état.  Between 
1966 and 1981 Ghana experienced numerous changes of military rule. In 1981 with another 
coup Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings came to power. He ruled Ghana for almost 10 years till the 
transformation towards democracy started.  
When Rawlings seized the power, he abolished the 1979 Constitution, which was 
modelled on the example of Western democracies, dismissed then President Dr. Hilla Limann 
and his cabinet, dissolved the Parliament and denounced all political parties. Rawlings 
established Provisional National Defence Council (further – PNDC) which he chaired himself. 
Through PNDC he could exercise both legislative and executive powers. Rawlings created 
many additional institutions, such as the National Investigation Committee (fighting 
corruption and economic crimes), Citizens‟ Vetting Committee (penalizing tax evasion), and 
Public Tribunals (for other crimes).  In 1982 the decentralization of government was 
                                                          
16 Ghana was the first European colony in sub-Saharan Africa to obtain independence (Freedom House 2010). 
20 
 
announced, although the overall power was maintained in the hands of Rawlings (he was 
appointing the district officers). Ghana was kept under strict control during the decade of 
military rule (Background Note: Ghana 2010). 
Political life was in a vacuum in the 1990s: “Until 1991, the PNDC‟s only real 
concession was to organize non-party elections to district councils in late 1988 and early 
1989” (Gyimah-Boadi 1994, 78). Rawlings imposed strict limitations to everyday life of 
Ghanaians. Gyimah-Boadi (1994) enlists: imprisonment without trial, confiscation of private 
property, forcing people into exile, rigid control of media, propaganda campaigns and many 
others. It was military regime in its strictest sense. The author notices, that although PNDC‟s 
rule was not as cruel or memorable as some other African military dictators practiced, still it 
was considerably long. While other African countries were already moving towards 
democratization, Ghana was still under the “steal fist” of Rawlings.  
During the Rawlings rule, Ghana faced multiple issues. First of all, in the early 1990s 
it had to absorb around one million returnees from Nigeria. In 1985 additional 100.000 were 
expelled. Secondly, country was hit by one of the biggest droughts in decades, which together 
with declining foreign aid gave another blow to struggling economy of Ghana. Although 
overall country‟s economy started improving in 1984-85, the sudden drop of cocoa and gold 
prices, the main exports of the country, resulted in high inflation (Background Note: Ghana, 
2010).  Due to these and many other problems military regime was also heavily affected and 
could not stay in status quo any longer.  
 
4.2 MOVE TOWARDS DEMOCRATIZATION (1991-1992) 
Ghanaian transition towards democracy, as in the whole African region, was 
encouraged by similar external and internal factors. Due to the end of the Cold War and the 
events in Eastern Europe, the West could no longer support autocratic regimes. As Saaka 
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(1997) notices, Ghana was one of the countries that thoroughly followed the IMF and World 
Bank instructions in the 1970s and 1980s and because of that the country was in friendly 
relations with Western countries. Ghana received quite a big portion of financial support
17
. In 
order that Western countries would keep the aid flowing and in such a way ensure the same 
pace of Ghana‟s development, the regime change had to take place. Democracy was 
considered to be the key condition for further cooperation in the following years. The United 
States and Britain, being the main aid givers, could not ignore the autocratic regimes any 
longer, and in the 1990s Rawlings was literally pressed to the corner. 
Movements inside the country, such as the Movement for Freedom and Justice
18
, led 
by Albert Adu Boahen, also did not let Rawlings relax. Through his academic work Boahen 
broke the so called “culture of silence” which marked the whole Rawlings regime – in 1988 
he held and open lecture titled “The Ghanaian Sphinx: Reflections on the Contemporary 
History of Ghana, 1972–1987” (Professor Emeritus Albert Adu Boahen 2006). Yet at that 
time the citizens‟ movement was not very strong and vocal.  
Combination of internal and external factors forced PNDC towards the return of 
constitutionalism (Background Note: Ghana 2010): 
 A special advisory committee – a 258 member Consultative Assembly – was 
established to draft new Constitution with reference to PNDC proposals; 
 In 1992 April Constitution was approved by national referendum; 
 On May of the same year political parties could function again in preparation 
for the coming multiparty elections; 
 PNDC formed a new party – National Democratic Congress (further – NDC) 
– in preparation for the coming elections; 
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 „Net resources to Ghana under official foreign aid rose from about $270 million in 1984 to $385 million in 
1986, and to $480 million in 1990“ (Leechor 1994, 172). 
18 Movement was established in 1978. 
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 Presidential elections took place on December 29, 1992;  
 On January 7, 1993, Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings was inaugurated as a 
President.  
As a result, since 1993 Ghana has been perceived as a democratic republic. Yet as it 
was observed in the previous chapter, elections per se do not represent consolidation of 
democracy. Similarly in the case of Ghana 1993 Presidential and Parliamentary elections 
were a chance for Rawlings to legitimize his power as a ruler of Ghana in a civilian manner 
while implementing the Western condition to end military rule. According to Ihonvbere 
(1997, 94), the return to a civil regime was planned by Rawlings from the very beginning as 
he created an “elaborate agenda to endear himself to the populace, discredit other political 
actors, and consolidate his control over the resources and institutions of state.” He even used 
governmental funds to prepare for elections and his campaign.  
Opposition parties protested against such visible breaches within the procedure of 
elections yet continued to participate as it was the choice between two evils. It was the first 
multiparty election in years; and although small, there was a chance that the government 
might be interested in a fair process (Saaka 1997). However, after it became obvious that 
elections were falsely carried out, most of the opposition parties boycotted the following 
parliamentary elections. The 1992 events were closely monitored by the multiple 
international monitoring bodies - the Commonwealth Observer Group, the OAU Observer 
Group, and the Carter Observer Group – but that did not prevent manipulation. Paradoxically, 
the very same monitoring agencies let slip from their observations the dissatisfaction 
expressed by the opposition parties.  
To add more, right after the establishment of the new “democratic” government, the 
British Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, and his minister of Overseas Development, 
Baroness Lynda Chalker, both visited Ghana, “ostensibly to lend international credibility to 
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the new Rawlings government” (Saaka 1997, 165). Other Western countries also expressed 
their congratulations, and in such a way de facto admitted the Rawlings government as 
acceptable within the international community. This once more showed that establishment of 
real democracy in Africa was not the main objective of the West. For them, the main concern 
was just to keep the façade.  
Although the 1992 elections did not create the real change of the government towards 
democracy, it was an undeniable push for further transition. The 1992 Constitution granted 
quite wide freedom of speech; forbade any kind of censure and in such a way generated the 
growth of independent media as well as empowered the general public to start voicing its 
political opinion. In such a way civil society was encouraged to come out from the 
underground creating an altogether more active citizens‟ participation. Moreover, the 
opposition actively used the government institutions – especially the judiciary – to reach the 
goal of real democratization. Through the Supreme Court of Ghana the government‟s 
behaviour was constantly questioned (Boafo-Arthur 2008). 
4.3 CONSOLIDATING DEMOCRACY IN GHANA 
If the 1993 elections were not the democratization, how and when did the real 
consolidation of democracy take place in Ghana? Democracy “rooted” in Ghana due to 
several factors: each is a celebration of democracy in its own way, and each added to the 
creation of majority‟s trust in this form of governing. They can be enumerated as the 
following: elections, independent institutions, free media, organized civil society, and 
ethnicity. Each will be covered separately, yet keeping in mind the idea that all in one way or 
in another are interconnected and dependent.  
4.3.1. Elections   
One of the breaking points which showed a positive change within the country was the 
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2000 Presidential elections. Although during elections tension remained high
19
, for the first 
time in the Ghanaian history power democratically was shifted to a newly elected president 
John A. Kufour of the New Patriotic Party (further – NPP), who defeated the candidate of 
NDC‟s party John Atta Mills, picked by Rawlings to be his successor. Kufour was re-elected 
again in 2004 with a “52, 45% of the vote against three other presidential candidates, 
including former Vice-President John Atta Mills of the NDC” (Background Note: Ghana 
2010). Last Presidential and Parliamentary elections in Ghana were held in 2008, December. 
This time Mills won in the second round (in the first one none of the eight participating 
candidates exceeded 50% of the votes). According to the Freedom House Countries at the 
Crossroads 2010, from all five Presidential and legislative elections which took place 
between 1992 and 2008 each was an improvement of the previous one. In the last decade, 
power was transferred two times between the two main parties of the country and because of 
that Ghana‟s case is almost unique among Sub-Saharan democracies. 
Presidential elections which took place in 2000 did not avoid fraud, such as unrealistic 
percentage of registered voters. Special steps were taken to fight with double registering – 
checking photo IDs, marking voters fingers with indelible ink. The Electoral Commission 
played a pivotal role in ensuring the transparency and building trust and belief in the election 
process between the people.  Also, important part was played by the domestic observers 
which united into a group called Coalition of Domestic Election Observers
20
 for the 2000 
election. Their participation and work ensured more transparent elections as local observers 
were participating not only on the day of election. They were able to follow the situation, 
evaluate it and observe long before the elections took place, during them and after. Locals 
                                                          
19 There were many doubts whether Rawlings would step down and abide to the two-term constitutional limit; 
would he let the winner to take over, or would he deny the results and use military force to get the power back. 
20
 “CODEO comprises over 20 prominent civic bodies such as the Ghana National Union of Teachers, National 
Union of Ghana Students, Nurses and Midwives Association, Civil Servants Association, the Ghana Bar 
Association, Ghana Legal Literacy Resources Foundation and Trades Union Congress” (Center for Democratic 
Development – Ghana (further – CDD-Ghana) 1(4) 2000, 4). 
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were more trusted by the Ghanaians, they could evaluate the situation more accurately; 
therefore, they had more advantages over the international observers. Moreover, it showed 
how much Ghanaians themselves wanted to be involved in this process and ensure that 
election indeed represented the real opinion of the population.   
Wide coverage of the event by free press was one of the positive indicators: “Ghana 
Broadcasting Corporation, the largest and most powerful media organization in the country, 
publishing an elaborate set of guidelines agreed to by the political parties and aimed at 
allocating equal media access to all presidential candidates” (CDD-Ghana 1(4) 2000, 5). Also 
it is important to mention the Presidential candidates‟ debate21 – first of this kind not only in 
Ghana, but also in Africa (apart from South Africa) – which took place on September 27. It 
was broadcasted live around the world by CNN and the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation. The fact alone that public was able to hear all opinions and voice their own 
showed the existence of certain level of democracy, enabling people to pursue even deeper 
democratization through fairly and openly elected representatives. Although according to the 
official records the voter turnout was 62 %, Gyimah-Boadi and Mansah (2003, 21) claim that 
it “was more likely between 76 and 81 percent.” Such high voters‟ turnout is rare even in 
Western countries that have old democratic traditions. Conversely, in the West people are 
losing interest in exercising their rights (to vote, to voice their opinion and actively 
participate in country‟s administration). 
As mentioned earlier, the following elections solidified Ghana‟s status as a democracy 
on its way to real consolidation. The 2004 elections, according to CDD-Ghana‟s “Democracy 
Watch” (2004), was very peaceful and represented the real opinion of Ghanaians. As NDC 
got almost 1/3 of Parliament‟s seats, it ensured a “strong opposition, a necessity in a working 
                                                          
21
 NDCs candidate Vice President John Atta Mills, did not participate, and it was feared that due to that the 
credibility and equality of the debate might be lowered in the eyes of the voters. But as Center for Democratic 
Development observed, “the event succeeded in providing a common platform for the articulation of alternative 
perspectives on critical issues facing the nation” (CDD-Ghana 1(4) 2000, 5). 
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democracy” (CDD-Ghana 5(4) 2004, 1).  Being a natural rival to NPP it questioned its policy 
steps, followed how NPP fulfilled their election promises and was playing a role of a pressure 
group. Overall, that is how it works in a democratic system – having to navigate between 
different opinions and various needs, only the ones that represent people the best, stay. 
Apparently, Ghanaian society was not satisfied with the subsequent 4 years of NPP rule, thus 
in 2008 NDC came to power. Incumbent party was overthrown by an opposition.  
The 2008 elections, if compared with i.e. Lithuania‟s, USA, South Africa‟s elections, 
would still not be perfectly democratic. Campaigning was not so spotless, there were acts of 
defamation, mistrust between rivals. Moreover, there could be seen limitations in the political 
sophistication of the constituents. There were many cases when people registered for various 
reasons which had no connection with the elections, i.e. young people “had gone for new 
voter ID cards  because the cards could also be used for identification in transacting other 
business in the formal sector (such as opening bank accounts)” (CDD-Ghana 8(2) 2009, 3). 
Although Ghana has a special body – the National Commission on Civic Education – which, 
according to the Ghanaian Constitution is responsible for this particular issue, a big gap that 
still needs to be taken care of remains.  On the other hand, having such a body established 
already shows the understanding and acceptance of the problem itself and search for the 
means to tackle it.  
Simple examples can be taken as a proof of existence of consolidated democracy in 
Ghana: the acceptance by the rival political powers of their loss in elections and recognition 
of the winning party. During the 2009 Presidential inauguration ceremony, when Prof. John 
Evans Fiifi Atta Mills was being inaugurated, the losing candidate Nana Addo Dankwa 
Akufo-Addo also participated (Ankomah n.d.).  For any democratic society in the western 
world this would seem a completely normal behaviour, yet in Africa it is still rare. It is 
enough to look at the Ivory Coast, a Ghana‟s neighbour, which recently was a divided war 
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zone as former president Laurent Gbagbo was refusing to step down and give way to the 
internationally recognized winner of 2010 Presidential election Alassane Quattaras.  
All that was mentioned seems to be everyday life examples for any “seasoned” 
democracy, yet for Ghana (and for Sub-Saharan Africa in general) these little steps forward 
are the real gains. Although elections looking closely is still not the epitome of perfectness, 
neither it is in any country. It is important that Ghanaians themselves realise that democracy 
as such cannot originate overnight. Research of Gyimah-Boadi and Mensah (2003, 28) on 
this topic shows that “respondents agree with the suggestion the current multiparty electoral 
system should be given more time.” This general acceptance of not perfectly perfect 
democracy is a sign of overall consensus among the majority of the population that no matter 
how hard this road might be, there are no other acceptable options. In the end, democracy is 
the best possible way of ruling the country. Although at the moment there might be some 
lapses in the system, it is all fixable in the long run.  
4.3.2. Independent Institutions 
Another important feature that can be accounted as contributing to the consolidation of 
democracy in Ghana is governmental institutions. Elections take place once in a few years, 
while the everyday life of the country is continuously dependent on the apparatus. It has a 
specific institutional memory and cannot be changed from day one when the new government 
comes into power. There are multiple laws that oversee important daily business; 
bureaucratic system has a lot of employees – it all creates a corrupted and inoperative legacy 
of the previous regime. Yet, despite the system being defective, one has to work with what 
one has at hand. 
The biggest change (as well as a considerable challenge) was felt in 2000 when NPP 
won the elections. Quite naturally, the first steps by the newly elected government were to re-
establish public trust and start implementing Kufuor‟s “zero-tolerance for corruption” policy. 
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The former Deputy Minister of Finance faced trial on the grounds of conspiracy and financial 
mismanagement. From one perspective it might have looked (and NDC did suggest such an 
idea) that NPP was trying to avenge and destroy the rivals. Yet it is the principle law that the 
guilty should not escape punishment. The former member of Ghana‟s government was tried 
on equal grounds, by a fair trial, and he could exercise his rights to be represented and defend 
himself (CDD-Ghana 2(4) 2001). Therefore, it cannot be seen as a way of tackling with 
political opponents. In this particular case that was an execution of justice. 
It is important to note that Ghanaian courts have established themselves as 
independent institutions even when Rawlings was still in power during the 90s. The Supreme 
Court in the NPP vs. the Inspector General of Police ruled that: 
“No permit is needed from police or any other authority for the holding of a 
procession, demonstration, rally or a public celebration of any traditional 
custom or cultural performance by any person, group or organization.” (Boafo-
Arthur, 2008, 23) 
Through this ruling the Supreme Court defended the freedom of assembly, which was 
in the 1992 Constitution (yet not usable due to the police which banned demonstrations if 
they were diverted against government). Of course, the other question is if in reality the 
Supreme Court judgements were realised and if they limited the Rawlings administration. 
The keynote is that the judicial part of the state‟s apparatus earned peoples‟ sympathies; it 
remained a trustworthy institution during later stages of Ghana‟s democratisation.  
Another important and worth to mention court ruling is the decision to outlaw the 
December 31
st
 celebration
22
. Such celebration was deemed to be inconsistent with a 
democratic Ghana – or at least with such posture that Ghana was taking for the outside world. 
Naturally, Rawlings was discontented as it was the celebration for his honour - he was the 
one who organized the coup in 1981. Therefore, the Justices of the Supreme Court, who 
                                                          
22 In 31 December, 1981 the civilian regime of the then President Hilla Limann was overthrown and since then 
the day was celebrated as a public holiday (Boafo-Arthur 2008).   
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passed that ruling, were under pressure; some of them eventually resigned. Again, the most 
significant result from all this was that “the outcomes of the court cases assured Ghanaians of 
the impartiality of the judiciary and of the judiciary‟s preparedness to maintain its autonomy” 
(Boafo-Arthur 2008, 24). The resistance within the institutions to the autocratic rule showed 
the possibility to reach for more inclusive goals of democratisation.   
Therefore, after the 2000 elections judiciary could get to work with much more 
confidence and approval that came from the general public compared to any other Ghanaian 
institution. For example, one of the first moves made by the Supreme Court was taking away 
some of the decision powers from the President: he could no longer appoint the CEO of state-
media (CDD Ghana 1(4) 2000). Such de-centralisation of powers could be interpreted as a 
mean to create protectors that would prevent the possible misuse of power by the top officers 
of the country in the future, and a check and balances system. From his side, President 
Kufuor also took additional steps to ensure the democratisation of governance. He formed an 
all-inclusive Council of State: three members were traditional rulers, the ethnic diversity was 
ensured as well as individuals from other political traditions were included (CDD-Ghana 
2(2&3) 2001). Council was formed not solely from the incumbent party‟s representatives 
(what is common in any seasoned democracy – the winners form the Government and tend to 
implement their political goals), but also with some possibility for the opposition to actively 
participate and oversee the actions of the Government.  
Another important change in the institutional level was the re-establishment of civil-
military relations. This is a very tender question for any country that was affected by the 
military rule. The most important step to be taken is to draw the line between the military and 
the government, and to ensure that the military will not get involved in the everyday life. As 
Crawford (2004, 13-14) notices: “Despite over a decade of constitutional rule, there remains 
a perception of the military as politically partisan, given its close association with both 
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military PNDC and elected NDC governments.” which in the eyes of the people was same 
dictatorship under different “civilian outfit.” It takes time for the military to reform itself and 
to re-establish the subordination. The military commanders, who for such a long time were 
used to being the highest officials making decisions, now faced a tough period, as suddenly 
they had to give that power back to the people.  
In Ghana‟s case, this transition was not an easy one either – at some point the military 
would still act on their own account and “would not betray miscreants from within” as well as 
showed little interest in “redeeming public confidence in the institution” (CDD-Ghana 1(4) 
2000, 9). Soldiers needed re-orientation of their mission. In the most general, worldwide 
accepted, sense, the role of military is to ensure country‟s security from any outside threats. 
Therefore, it has nothing to do with everyday civilian life. For a soldier it has to be a choice 
as any other career, not just an easy way towards power and easy money. Therefore, after 
2000 elections the new government worked considerably on improving the civil-military 
relations in numerous ways: police took over the civil security, the 64
th
 Regiment
23
 was sent 
to the peacekeeping missions abroad, the wellbeing of military service was improved (general 
amenities in the military compounds, better social security), etc. (Crawford 2004).  
In conclusion, not only the institutions were adapting to the democratic changes, but 
also parties (specifically, the NDC) were affected by the democratisation process. Rawlings 
was a founder of NDC and also a co-chairman of the party. In 2002, co-chairmanship was 
abolished leaving Rawlings with the title of the founder, but denying any decisive voice in 
the party (CDD-Ghana 3(2&3) 2002). At that point his active political career was finished. 
Even if he remained the main figure of ideology, an influential political personality, he could 
no longer affect the decisions unilaterally. Thus, more democratised parties could create a 
more democratic governing body. 
                                                          
23 This regiment was the backbone of Rawlings military – army professionals, who were working for the regime.  
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4.3.3. Free Media   
Media has also to be heavily accounted for a consolidation of democracy through its 
active participation in Ghanaian politics. When in 2001 the Criminal Libel Law
24
 was 
nullified, journalists could at last truly devote themselves to real and unrestricted journalism 
as is understood around the world. Agyeman-Duah (n.d.) observes that “in 1990, there were 
just four state-owned newspapers in addition to the 60-year old Ghana Broadcasting 
Corporation” in comparison to the recent years when “127 radio stations, 6 TV stations and 
more than 60 newspapers” were established.  Such a sharp increase shows the existence of 
favourable conditions for the media to thrive.  
During the Rawlings rule media was denied the freedom of speech no matter that it 
was foreseen in the 1992 Constitution (Chapter 5, Section 21).  It was the freedom of speech 
as understood by Rawlings: “You can write anything about civilians, but not military officers” 
(CDD-Ghana 1(2) 2000, 7), granted very selectively as in any dictatorship, and highly 
censored. Therefore, the newly found freedom was as a fresh breeze for journalism in Ghana, 
which suddenly flourished giving a very wide and descriptive coverage of all elections, and at 
the same time presenting the people with an opportunity to be educated through the media. 
The government itself became more open to the media and more willing to face it (CDD-
Ghana 2(1) 2001). Politics turned out to be the “hottest” issue25 at hand.  
One of the most important means of media in Ghana is radio. It is important to take 
into consideration, that not everybody is literate enough, moreover, has enough money to 
read newspapers or watch television. People who have access to such means of media mostly 
live in big cities. Meanwhile, the only accessible way of reaching the local public, settled in 
                                                          
24 Criminal Libel Law restricted journalists as it was seen fit to the Rawlings government; because of that law 
many journalists (if they were seen to contradict the official policy) were sentenced on criminal grounds.  
25
 Newspapers even started using political caricatures. In one of such cartoons Mills was portrayed as a dog. In 
such way Mills was shown as “a puppet of the Rawlings faction of the NDC” (CDD-Ghana, 3(4) 2002, 1). 
Actually, this particular article called a lot of attention, some of it requiring to publish an official apology, yet 
the magazine “stood its ground, defending the cartoon as an expression of free speech that was neither 
defamatory nor culturally improper” (CDD-Ghana, 3(4) 2002, 2).  
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the countryside, is through the radio
26
. Therefore, radio can be considered to be one of the 
most important tools of democratisation through media in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to 
the Ghana Country Report (2004), there are around 130
27
 licensed radio stations in Ghana 
who are broadcasting in English and/or in local languages. From time to time government did 
try to limit the radio translations, i.e. by “imposing a ban prohibiting inflammatory political 
content on radio phone-in shows” (Freedom House 2005); but quickly all bans were lifted as 
they were met by great disapproval of the society. Government has developed an 
understanding that popularity can be gained only by ensuring that society can use their 
inherited rights, and that government itself is dependent on society‟s opinion if it hopes to 
continue being in power.  
Also, it is important to stress the positive impact of IT – the spread of mobile phones 
enabled people to make phone calls and send text messages to radio stations and express their 
opinion without fear. This increases a more open and more democratic debate on air on 
various topics that otherwise would be considered to be a taboo to talk out loud. Another 
significant source of information and communication is the internet. In Ghana it takes a very 
strong position – Ghanaians actively participate in internet “chats” as well as through e-mails. 
Although internet is mostly accessible only though internet cafes, the usage of it has grown 
considerably since the democratisation “kicked-in” as can be seen in the Table No. 2 below: 
Table No. 2 
Internet User’s Growth in Ghana 1999-2009 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Internet 
users 
(per 100 
people) 
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.2 1.7 1.8 2.7 3.8 4.3 5.4 
 
                                                          
26
 Around 90% of population listens to radio at least once a week, about 69% - once a day (Ghana Country 
Report 2004).  
27
 Before 1996 – only 11 radio stations in Ghana (Ghana Country Report 2004). 
Data from the World Bank 
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Internet could be called today‟s harbour of information that quickly replaced 
newspapers or other means of information transfer to the wider public. Uncensored and 
growing use of internet also contributes to the consolidation of democracy. Not to mention 
that it can be a trigger of democratisation itself, as could be seen from the 2010 events that 
are still evolving all around North Africa and Middle East. Internet is an extremely powerful 
tool. 
Overall the media played a pivotal role in Ghana‟s process of consolidated democracy. 
Through the media it is possible to spread information, educate masses, and unite them and 
their opinions.  The media creates a more globalised Ghana that shares common goals.  
4.3.4. Civil Society   
Changes in the Constitutional order in the 90s envisaged safeguards for the freedom of 
expression, assembly, association; this encouraged the growth of the Civil Society 
Organisations (further - CSOs). Although their activities until the 2000 were quite restricted
28
, 
they still built up, and were working actively in the fields that were less political. People 
formed associations to improve their everyday lives: CSOs that concentrated on enhancing 
small business, farming, and education. These small CSOs through their communities 
approach educated the general public and unified it. Ghanaian civil society took an active part 
in a democracy consolidation process through peaceful protests of students, religious leaders 
and musicians. Ghanaian NGOs were also important players as they educated the public not 
only about the political situation, but also about the economic status of their country. 
Step by step civil society started acting more proactively. CDD-Ghana‟s newsletter 
(1(2) 2000, 6) quotes how 15 women from NETRIGHT
29
 demonstrated by the courthouse, 
and holds this to be a really important development towards democracy in early 2000 as such 
                                                          
28 Only selected CSOs enjoyed the freedoms granted by the Constitution, such as Friends of Attah-Mills, Atta- 
Mills Fan Club, infamous 31
st
 December Movement and other, that had a very strong governmental backup 
(including financial) (CDD-Ghana 2(2&3) 2001). 
29
 A coalition of NGOs and organizations operating in the field of gender (CDD-Ghana 1(2) 2000). 
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act was “free of harassment or arrest by state security agencies” and showed “the degree of 
expansion of the space for non-violent positive action.” This rally in a small way suggested 
the possibility to use inherent rights more openly and encouraged people to be more active. 
Another case illustrates the interaction between two factors – media and civil society – that 
united their strength while working on “Monkey Business” – accepting the proposal from the 
USA based organization that was seeking to resettle chimpanzees in one of the Ghanaian 
regions. Through the wide coverage of media and strong support of local CSOs, government 
had to change its stance and withdraw from the talks (CDD-Ghana 1(2) 2000). At that time 
Ghana had no means or potential to take care of chimpanzees – accepting the proposal would 
have created a short term publicity and long term burden for the country that had other more 
important issues to deal with. Civil society is like a “grey cardinal” for the government that 
directs its actions reminding of peoples‟ interests. 
These days Ghanaian civil society can be seen as thriving, especially at grassroots 
level. It is the custom there to form different associations, such as farmers, traders, 
fishermen‟s etc. Of course, not all these groups are influential for the democratisation process; 
most of them are economically oriented. On the other hand, making a person part of any 
movement (whether it is oriented towards economics, culture or politics) has many 
advantages. When one becomes educated through personal experience about the possible 
changes that happen within small groups, there is a higher chance that such a person would 
become more active when it comes to other initiatives. Or at least he would be more 
positively minded towards most important decisions being taken by other politically oriented 
groups.  
Many politically oriented CSOs in Ghana are not dependant on the government 
financially. This gives certain flexibility for their actions. The downside of such CSOs, as 
Crawford (2004, 20) observes, is because they are mostly “Accra-based; elite focused; … 
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predominantly male membership.” Such a tendency has its explanation – most of the funds 
are coming from the international level, and the donors set the agenda that has to be fulfilled 
by the CSOs. These days the main concern (thus – the biggest funding get to it) is to decrease 
the poverty in Ghana. It leaves the empowerment of the local authorities on the second place. 
In order to solve this dilemma, there should be more internal funding (yet, not binding them 
to the government) for the CSOs which are politically oriented. They in the future could 
create a critical mass of population that could more proactively participate in country‟s 
political life and make Ghana not so dependent on international support – and eventually a 
self-sustaining country.  
4.3.5. Ethnicity   
Ethnicity plays an important part in any nation that consists of different groups of 
people who are interconnected by strong/or relatively strong bonds, and belong to one or 
other group that shares certain cultural traditions. Such are Belgians coming from different 
regions of the country (Flanders and Wallonia); Native Americans, Catalonians in Spain. As 
it is all around the globe, ethnicity is a very sensitive and important issue in Sub-Saharan 
Africa too. Actually, ethnicity matter is more emphasized in Africa more than anywhere else 
because of the already mentioned consequences of the colonization. There are numerous 
ethnic groups each with their customs, languages and lifestyle, which formed during 
thousands of years. They were interspersed through different countries and now they have to 
live in concord.  
Ghana‟s population consists of several ethnic groups: Akan (~45%), Mole-Dagbon 
(~15%), Ewe (~11%), Ga-Dangme (~7%), Guan (~4%), Gurma (~4%), Grusi (~3%) and 
others (CIA: The World Factbook 2010). It is interesting, that once Ghana gained its 
independence in the 60s, local authorities, formed by the traditional rulers, were quite 
effective – they “ran decent schools and clinics, and khaki uniformed agents of the “Town 
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Councils” effectively enforced sanitation and environmental standards” (CDD-Ghana 8(4) 
2010, 11). Traditions remain very much alive even today; tribal leaders possess great power 
and influence. One example can be cited when chieftains were restricted from travelling 
through other tribal leaders‟ grounds as if it was another country where one needs to have a 
special visa. Although such a hereditary regulation contradicts the Constitution, it is justified 
by invoking a traditional norm which states: “No chief styled as king or „odikro‟ can 
transcend the border of another chief‟s domain without seeking the express permission of the 
overlord of land” (CDD-Ghana 1(3) 2000, 3). Therefore, traditional rulers might have no 
direct power, but they continue governing the hearts and the minds of the majority of the 
Ghanaian population. Therefore, undeniably they have an effect on the overall Ghanaian 
politics.  
The tendency of the voters to vote based on their ethnicity/their local region can be 
clearly distinguished.  As it was observed by Gyimah-Boadi and Mensah (2003, 22), “the 
reservoir of support for the NPP is deepest in the Ashanti and Eastern regions,” while for the 
NDC - in Volta and Upper East Regions. Ethnic majorities hold support for the specific party. 
From the first glance, such electoral distribution might hinder the democracy, but as it can be 
seen from Ghana‟s case, ethnicity interblends. Ethnicity (and people‟s polarization based on 
that) not necessarily is destructible. First of all, people move inside the country – Ghana is 
becoming more and more urbanized, thus eventually the ethnic borders mix. Secondly, 
“ethnic differences as compared to other polities are not so fractious, irreconcilable or 
unamenable to negotiations” (Boafo-Arthur 2008, 64). It is important to look into the issue of 
ethnicity not as one that divides the nation, but the one that can unite the nation even more, 
thus encouraging the growth of democracy, not the other way around.  
In November 2000, the traditional rulers convened and created a resolution (“Osu 
Declaration”) with which the inter-party violence was stopped (CDD-Ghana, 2000). This was 
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done in order to ensure the peaceful and legitimate elections that were approaching at that 
time. Such co-operation among chieftains (that usually are rivals) for the sake of peaceful 
election can be seen as representing the consensus of society to reach consolidated 
democracy and accept it as the best possible way of governing the country. This example 
clearly demonstrates the input of ethnicity of the process of democratisation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS 
In Sub-Saharan Africa a long term stable democracy is unfortunately not common. 
Emerging from the transition stage to a somewhat stable phase of democracy is an incredible 
success. Understanding the successful path of Ghana does provide crucial insight in the 
38 
 
process of democratization and how this could be replicated in other African countries. It is 
important to stress that democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa has to reflect the countries‟ 
inherent characteristics. The African culture differs much from the western culture in the 
aspects of traditions, ethnical background, thus western democracy cannot be imported as a 
readymade product. It has to be adapted to its environment.  
When Gyimah-Boadi and Mensah (2003, 27) carried the survey in Ghana for their 
Afrobarometer study, they found that regular Ghanaians are not familiar with the term 
“democracy” at all, therefore that survey could not reflect their real opinion. In order to get 
the opinions of the interviewees concerning that question, they used the definition of the 
democracy concept that is well known and understood in Ghana: “speak and let me speak.”  
This example confirms the need of a very specific approach and knowledge of the country if 
one wants to simply understand it. In order to change the whole regime of the country a much 
bigger effort is needed, and a longer time period. A democracy established on the foundations 
of African culture and historical background is the one which suits Africa best. Such 
democracy is robust and has a much higher chance to survive, which the imposed model of 
“foreign”/Western style democracy would fail to do.   
Looking into Ghana‟s case, one single factor cannot be distinguished as enabling the 
success of consolidation of a democratic rule. Stable democratic regime, as it is now, was 
created through a set of specific conditions, such as increased political awareness of society, 
growing sector of free media, real application of the letter of Constitution.  Each of them 
played an important role in the overall process. Boafo-Arthur (2008, 42) lists more 
specifically the factors which, according to him, enabled successful and long term transition 
in Ghana: 
„memories of the past, enhanced civil-military relations, activities of civil societies 
organizations and think tanks in the areas of human, political, civil rights education, 
media pluralism, disbanding of para-military organizations, banning of ex-President 
Rawlings from visiting military installations, decentralization of intelligence 
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gathering, and relations with development partners” 
The beginning of Ghana‟s democratisation since 1990s was flawed. Yet once the real 
democratisation started with the break of the new millennium, the flawed democracy was 
changed through active people‟s participation. Every chance that re-opened for the general 
population was used. In this way the real democracy in Ghana started to slowly develop – 
people took part in elections (which were free and competitive), started printing newspapers, 
media took an active role in the political life of the country. In a sense there was a mass 
impetus that moved Ghanaians together to realise their freedoms. Civil society flourished and 
started growing establishing itself in various forms and various sizes – starting from 
grassroots, to CSOs and to parties. Therefore, it can be said that it was crucial for the general 
public to get hold of their inherent rights. People are the ones who make the democracy work 
– not a single person, who allows it to exist.  
Overall, Ghana‟s democratisation was initialized by the following evolutionary factors 
(one influences the other + mutual relationship):   
 general situation/climate in the country (as well as in the region) lead to the 
loosening of the restrictions; 
 real application of the constitutional rights; 
 boom of the freedom of speech and association; 
 free competitive elections. 
Afterwards, these factors continued to grow and further progress. Therefore, the same 
factors that once were the reason for the democratisation became the outcomes as well, or to 
say, the basis for further and deeper consolidation. For example, free media in the dawn of 
the democratization process educated the general public through the constant and diverse 
flow of relevant information. Today – its mission remains more or less the same – portraying 
the actualities of the country and informing Ghanaians. It is a continuous and changing 
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process of growth. 
Ghana can be a benchmark to successful transition to democratization for other 
countries; just to name a few neighbours: Niger, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Burkina Faso. All 
today are considered to be partly free
30
 with frontmen who have transformed themselves from 
military dictators to “democratic” rulers. Today these countries are in a similar stage as pre-
democratised Ghana – high level of corruption, centralisation of power within military, 
elections in which the same ruler wins again and again, partial censorship of media, 
restrictions on constitutional rights and liberties etc.  
To avoid misunderstandings, the hypothesis of this paper is not saying that creating 
the same conditions and steps towards the change of the regime in another Sub-Saharan 
country as they were in Ghana would result in a long term democracy, simply because it 
would be impossible to re-create them in another country. Instead, by looking at the trends of 
success of Ghana (also see – Table No. 3 in page 41) as an inspiration and driving force, 
similar successful change of military regime could be enacted in another Sub-Saharan 
country while using conditions that are already available there. As well as through 
improving/empowering sectors which could help for such transition to happen, for example, 
concentrating more on creation of a united and solid civil society body, if such is missing (or 
i.e. confronting the corruption if it is limiting the democratisation process). In conclusion, 
Ghana‟s case delivers the message of hope and courage that it is possible for the countries of 
Sub-Saharan Africa to be stable and prosperous democracies.   
Table No. 3 
 Factors of Successful Democratization of Ghana 
Factor’s which Created Impetus for 
Consolidated Democracy in Ghana 
Lessons to Learn for Other Sub-Saharan 
Countries 
 Elections 
 
 Multiparty participation in the elections 
process; 
                                                          
30
 According to Freedom House data (2011).  
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 Domestic elections observers, working 
before and after the election day; 
 Education of electors. 
 
 Independent Institutions 
 
 Trustworthy institutions (especially the court 
system); 
 Division of powers between the main 
institutions 
(President/Parliament/Government/Court); 
 Change of civil servants (not the same from 
the military regime days); 
 Learning from the good practices of old 
traditions. 
 Free Media 
 
 Freedom of speech; 
 Accessibility for the masses; 
 Objective information; 
 Use of modern means of communication – 
mobile phones, internet etc. 
 Civil Society 
 
 Importance of grassroots; 
 Growing awareness and participation of the 
people; 
 Increase of funding for the CSOs. 
 Ethnicity  Importance of conflict resolution within the 
tribal groups; 
 Closure; 
 Ethnicity as a rally point for democracy, not 
the other way around. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
It is paradoxical, that at the age of globalisation, modernization, the rapidly changing 
world, and the growth of emerging economies, oppressive regimes continue their existence. 
In the last 6 months the revolutionary uprisings by the common people in Northern Africa 
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and Middle East seem to have taken control over their future, yet in many parts of the world 
similar problems remain unsolved. The focus of this paper is the unstable situation in Sub-
Saharan Africa and the political influence of a military dictatorship on the region.  Almost all 
African countries have experienced a military dictatorship or other form of autocratic regime 
in the past. Today, there still remain quite a big number of such dictatorships. The reasons for 
such a tendency can be found while analysing external and internal factors. But the most 
important issue at hand is how such a regime can become a consolidated democracy.  
Consolidated democracy does not have a unified definition, as it is a debatable 
question between theorists. One could accentuate the outcome of the consolidation - creation 
of stable democratic governance in the country. To reach this goal it is not enough simply to 
hold relatively open and competitive elections. Especially in the African context, much more 
is needed – establishment of an overall consensus, and generation of social capital. 
Population has to acquire belief in their own abilities which eventually could generate more 
independence from the outside forces. This critical mass would eventually become a more 
stable and reliable governing apparatus.   
Ghana‟s case is a successful example of a considerably consolidated democracy. 
Process of consolidation in Ghana happened over the last decade, and although it cannot be 
said that it is over (as there is still a long road ahead), yet it managed to successfully 
transform from the military dictatorship to a democratic republic. Consolidation was induced 
by an impulse that evolved within the country:  peoples‟ aspiration to take control of their 
country. Starting from the active participation in the elections, where they could express their 
political will, and other forms of the virile presence in the Ghanaian political life through 
media, CSOs. It should be noted that together with the political change, Ghanaian society 
also grew and developed; it learned from the best practice that could be collected from the old 
traditions as well as from the contemporary practices. Consolidation cannot be achieved by 
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simply overthrowing the previous oppressive regime and installing a democratically elected 
one. Today Ghanaians came a long way in finding consolidation within the society – within 
ethnic groups as well as within each other. 
Democracy is like a house. In order to build a robust house that can withstands harsh 
conditions for ages, one needs materials and a specific knowledge (not only about the process, 
but also about the location, available materials that would fit best etc.). If the house is built 
from materials that are not suitable for the climate zone, it might collapse or be uninhabited. 
The same can be applied to democracy – it can be “built.” The most resistant democracy is 
one that is based on local foundations and is created by local people who own that local 
knowledge. Therefore, the Ghana‟s case is relevant in the overall context of Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Learning from the good practices of the neighbours who already have gone through 
similar challenges should be an inspiration for others still struggling. 
“Importing democracy,” as America tried to do in Iraq, is not an option. Is western 
democracy so perfect? Every day there are scandals all over the press about corruption, 
money laundering and other misbehaviour of the representatives democratically elected by 
the majority of western populations. Therefore, today nobody lives in a perfect democracy. 
Au contraire! Everybody is just reaching for the same goal and slowly approaching that 
perfect utopian dream. Ghana can be the leader for the rest of Sub-Saharan nations on their 
common way towards an ever better democratisation.  
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Data from Freedom House 
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 Spread of Democratisation across the Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ANNEX III 
Table No. 5 
Ghana’s rating in Africa 
Data from Freedom House 
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GHANA   
   
 2008/9 2008/9 
  
Rank / 
53 
Score / 
100 
Overall 7 64.6 
Safety And Rule Of Law 6 74.8 
Personal Safety 15 57. 
Rule Of Law 4 84.2 
Accountability and corruption 8 64.8 
National Security 19 92.6 
Participation And Human Rights 6 67.9 
Participation 9 71.5 
Rights 3 73.2 
Gender 18 59.0 
Sustainable Economic 
Opportunity 12 53.5 
Public Management 31 59.2 
Private Sector 11 61.9 
Infrastructure 24 22.2 
Environment And The Rural 
Sector 6 70.4 
Human Development 12 62.3 
Health And Welfare 16 62.9 
Education 11 61.7 
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